Selected cases

Court of Appeal of England and Wales · [2020] EWCA Civ 246

Chapelgate Credit Opportunity Master Fund Ltd v Money & Ors

Instead, judges keep a broad discretion to decide what is just in the circumstances.

Court of Appeal of England and Wales25 Feb 2020

Plain-English explainers, not legal advice. Use the linked official source for section-level detail, and get advice for your situation.

Get legal help

Start here

Quick read

  • If your business is using a commercial funder to back a claim, do not assume the funder’s downside is automatically capped at the amount it puts in.
  • Chapelgate Credit Opportunity Master Fund Ltd v Money & Ors is a leading Court of Appeal decision on third-party litigation funding and adverse costs.

Use this to check

  • The Arkin cap is not an automatic rule for commercial litigation funders.
  • Courts keep a broad discretion under section 51 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 to make a just costs order.
  • A funder’s potential profit and priority over recoveries can matter, not just the amount funded.

Decision snapshot

  1. What happened

    • The dispute reached the Court of Appeal after a failed set of proceedings concerning the administration of Angel House Developments Limited.
    • Dunbar Assets plc had appointed administrators to the company, and the company’s main asset, Angel House, was later sold for £17.05 million.
    • Ms Julie Davey, who owned and controlled the company, alleged that the administrators had breached duties, sold the property at a substantial undervalue and frustrated a proposed funded rescue.
    • She also alleged that Dunbar had interfered in the administration and was liable for wrongdoing connected with the sale process.
  2. What the court had to decide

    • The central issue was whether the Court of Appeal’s earlier decision in Arkin required a commercial litigation funder’s liability for adverse costs to be capped at the amount of its funding, or whether that cap was only one possible approach within the court’s wider discretion under section 51 of the Senior Courts Act 1981.
    • The appeal also raised the practical question of whether, on the facts of this case, the judge had been entitled to refuse the cap by taking into account matters such as ChapelGate’s commercial return, the funding structure, the absence of claimant-side ATE protection and the scale of the respondents’ likely defence costs.
  3. What the court decided

    • The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.
    • It held that the Arkin cap is not a binding rule that must be applied in every case involving a commercial funder.
    • Instead, judges retain a discretion to decide what is just in all the circumstances.

Practical impact

Practical read

  • If your business is using a commercial funder to back a claim, do not assume the funder’s downside is automatically capped at the amount it puts in.
  • This case shows the court can look at the whole commercial picture, including how much the funder stood to gain, whether the claim exposed several defendants to very large costs, whether serious allegations were pursued in an...
  • For business owners, the practical lesson is simple: funding terms, insurance, claim scope and litigation conduct all matter.
  • A funding deal that looks attractive at the start can create major costs exposure if the case fails.

Useful next steps

  • The Arkin cap is not an automatic rule for commercial litigation funders.
  • Courts keep a broad discretion under section 51 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 to make a just costs order.
  • A funder’s potential profit and priority over recoveries can matter, not just the amount funded.
  • If a funding structure leaves successful defendants heavily exposed and without ATE protection, that can count against applying a cap.
  • Businesses should review funding terms, insurance and claim conduct together before relying on external dispute funding.

The story

This appeal was not about whether the original claim should have succeeded. That had already been decided against Ms Davey. The Court of Appeal was asked a narrower but commercially important question: when a commercial funder backs failed litigation, must its liability for the winning side’s costs be capped at the amount it invested?

The underlying proceedings were serious and expensive. Ms Davey alleged that administrators had breached duties in the administration of Angel House Developments Limited and that Dunbar had interfered with the administration and conspired in relation to the sale of the company’s main asset. The trial judge later rejected those allegations and made indemnity costs orders against Ms Davey.

ChapelGate had funded the case as a commercial investment. It expected a significant return if the claim succeeded. After the claim failed, the successful parties sought costs orders against ChapelGate as a non-party funder. ChapelGate accepted that some costs order could be made against it, but argued that its liability should be capped by reference to the amount it had funded.

Practical sense check

  • The case concerned non-party costs against a commercial litigation funder
  • The funded claim involved multiple defendants and serious allegations
  • The underlying claim failed at trial
  • Indemnity costs had already been ordered against the claimant
  • The appeal focused on whether the funder’s liability had to be capped

What was being argued

ChapelGate relied on the well-known decision in Arkin. In that earlier case, a commercial funder that had financed part of an unsuccessful claim was ordered to pay the winners’ costs only up to the amount it had funded. ChapelGate argued that the same approach should apply here and that the judge should have limited its liability to the total funding it had provided.

The successful respondents argued that Arkin did not create a rigid rule. They said the court still had a broad discretion under section 51 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 to decide what was just in the circumstances. On their case, this was not a simple part-funding arrangement of the kind seen in Arkin. ChapelGate had funded the litigation as a commercial venture, stood to make a substantial return, and had structured the arrangement so that it would be paid ahead of the claimant from any proceeds.

That meant the court had to decide whether Arkin was a mandatory cap or just one possible approach within a wider discretion.

What the court decided

The Court of Appeal dismissed ChapelGate’s appeal. It held that the Arkin approach does not operate as a binding rule in every case involving a commercial funder. Judges retain a discretion and may, depending on the facts, decide not to limit the funder’s liability to the amount funded.

The court accepted that Arkin still has continuing relevance, especially where the facts are close to that case, such as where a funder only covers a distinct part of the claimant’s costs. But it rejected the idea that Arkin created an automatic cap. The court emphasised that section 51 gives the court a broad discretion and that the only immutable principle is that the discretion must be exercised justly.

On the facts here, the trial judge had been entitled to refuse the cap. This was not a narrow expert-evidence funding arrangement. ChapelGate funded the litigation as a commercial investment, funded all payments in respect of Ms Davey’s costs from the funding date, and stood to receive a multiple of its outlay if the claim succeeded.

What the court focused on

  • Arkin is an approach, not an automatic rule
  • The court’s discretion under section 51 remains broad
  • Justice on the facts is the controlling principle
  • A funder’s potential return can be relevant, not just its outlay
  • The judge was entitled to refuse a cap in this case

Why the cap was refused here

The Court of Appeal backed the judge’s reasoning that several features made this case different from Arkin. First, ChapelGate was not simply helping with one limited cost item. From the date of the funding agreement, all payments in respect of Ms Davey’s costs appear to have been made with ChapelGate’s money.

Second, ChapelGate stood to gain a substantial commercial return. The funding structure gave it priority in recoveries and a profit share that could amount to a multiple of its investment. The court said it was legitimate to look at those prospective gains as well as the amount spent.

Third, the litigation exposed the respondents to very large defence costs. There were multiple defendants, serious allegations and no realistic expectation of shared representation. The judge was entitled to consider the unfairness of leaving successful parties heavily out of pocket because of funding arrangements they had no control over.

Fourth, the ATE position mattered. The requirement for Ms Davey to obtain ATE insurance was waived, which removed a layer of protection for the respondents. Although ChapelGate may have viewed its own exposure as commercially unchanged, the court accepted that the respondents’ exposure had materially increased.

Practical sense check

  • Funding was not limited to a small discrete part of the case
  • The funder expected a significant return
  • The waterfall gave the funder priority over recoveries
  • The defendants faced very substantial costs
  • ATE protection for the defendants was not in place
  • The judge could consider the practical unfairness to successful parties

How to read this for your business

For business owners, the main point is that litigation funding is not just about getting cash to run a claim. It is also about who carries the downside if the case fails. This decision shows that courts may look beyond the headline funding amount and examine the real economics of the arrangement.

If your business is the claimant, a funding agreement with a steep waterfall and a large funder return may affect how a court views the funder’s role. If your business is defending a funded claim, this case supports arguments that a commercial funder should not always be protected by a simple cap, especially where the claim is broad, expensive and aggressively pursued.

The judgment also highlights the importance of adverse costs planning. ATE insurance, security for costs strategy, realistic pleadings and disciplined case management all matter. Serious allegations that are not properly supported can increase costs risk dramatically, including the risk of indemnity costs.

Operating checklist

Before entering a funded dispute, treat the funding package as a risk allocation document, not just a finance document. The court in this case paid close attention to the structure of the deal, the expected return and the absence of claimant-side ATE protection for opponents.

A practical review at the start can reduce the chance of a nasty costs surprise later. Businesses should also revisit the position as the case develops, especially if allegations become wider, costs rise or insurance assumptions change.

Common questions

What is the Arkin cap?

It is an approach taken from Arkin v Borchard Lines under which a commercial funder’s liability for the other side’s costs may be limited to the amount of funding it provided. This case confirms that the cap is not automatic.

Did the Court of Appeal abolish the Arkin cap?

No. The court said the Arkin approach still has relevance, especially on facts close to Arkin itself. But it is not a binding rule that must be applied in every funded case.

Why was ChapelGate exposed to uncapped costs?

The court accepted that the judge could look at the wider circumstances, including ChapelGate’s commercial return, the structure of the funding agreement, the lack of ATE protection for the defendants, the scale of likely defence costs and the way the claim had been pursued.

What should a business check before signing a litigation funding agreement?

Check the funder’s return, priority of payments, control provisions, adverse costs planning, insurance arrangements, budget assumptions and whether the claim strategy could expose the business or funder to indemnity costs.

Related topics

How Sprintlaw can help