The High Court dismissed the appeal. Mr Justice Trower agreed in substance with the Ombudsman that Serco and the trustees had correctly interpreted and applied the relevant rules. Mr McKavney was not entitled to immediate payment of his Serco pension either when ESRC was sold out of the Serco group in 2012 or when he was later made redundant by ESRC in 2015.
On the first route argued by Mr McKavney, the court focused on the wording about a member being compulsorily retired from service by the employer. The judge said that language more naturally describes employment ending through termination of the contract, rather than a TUPE transfer where the contract continues by operation of law with a new employer.
The court accepted that, after the sale to AMEC, Mr McKavney was no longer employed by an employer within the scheme definition and so was no longer in service in that defined sense. But that did not mean he had been compulsorily retired from service for the purpose of the early retirement rule. His employment had continued without cessation.
The court also rejected the idea that what happened amounted to redundancy. Redundancy has a technical meaning linked to dismissal for a particular reason. That was not what occurred in 2012. The transfer and sale moved the employment relationship to a different employer, but did not dismiss him.
On reorganisation, the court accepted that a business reorganisation can take many forms. Even so, the word had to be read in context. Here, it appeared alongside compulsory retirement from service and redundancy. The judge considered that the drafting pointed more naturally to a reorganisation leading to dismissal, rather than a transfer where employment continues.
The second route argued by Mr McKavney relied on the rule dealing with termination of pensionable service. The court accepted that he had left pensionable service when ESRC ceased to be a participating employer in the Serco scheme. But the judge agreed with the Ombudsman that the rule required more than that. It referred to the member’s service ending, and that wording was treated as different from merely leaving pensionable service.
In the court’s view, the contrast in language showed that the drafter intended to distinguish between stopping active participation in the scheme and employment ceasing altogether. Mr McKavney had left pensionable service, but his employment had continued outside the Serco group. That was not enough to trigger immediate payment under the rule.
The court also thought Mr McKavney’s interpretation sat awkwardly with the protected persons regulations. If immediate payment arose automatically as soon as he was no longer in service with a participating employer, that would undermine the separate right to transfer accrued rights into the new employer’s scheme within two years. Section F itself said it was intended to meet the requirements of the protected persons regulations and was subject to them. That made Mr McKavney’s reading less likely.