Acer Incorporated & Anor v Nokia Technologies Oy

This Court of Appeal decision sits in the specialised area of standard-essential patents and RAND licensing. The dispute was not really about whether Acer and ASUS needed a licence. They accepted that they did. The real fight was about who should decide the terms of that licence and on what process.

Acer and ASUS wanted the English court to determine the terms of a global RAND licence for Nokia’s codec SEP portfolio. Nokia said it had already offered a workable route: an immediate licence now, with the final terms to be decided later by ICC arbitration and then used to adjust the interim position.

The Court of Appeal drew a clear distinction between jurisdiction and outcome. It held that the English court had jurisdiction in principle over the RAND claims through a gateway linked to UK patents. But it also held that Nokia’s adjustable licence offers were offers on RAND terms. Because of that, the implementers could not insist that the English court should set the terms instead.

Nokia’s portfolio concerned patents declared essential to ITU-T video standards used to decode video streams. Acer and ASUS sold personal computer devices that could encode and decode those streams. They accepted that they needed a licence to Nokia’s codec SEP portfolio, but the parties had negotiated for years without reaching agreement.

As often happens in SEP disputes, both sides said they were willing to enter into RAND licences. The problem was that they disagreed on what RAND required in practice. The judgment records that the main commercial divide was price. It was also common ground that the licence should be global, not just a UK-only licence.

Starting on 28 March 2025, Nokia began infringement proceedings in several jurisdictions, including Germany, the Unified Patent Court, the USA, Brazil and India. Those proceedings sought injunctive or exclusionary relief. In commercial terms, that increased pressure on Acer and ASUS because the risk was not just damages later. It was the possibility of being shut out of markets.

Acer and ASUS then brought claims in the English Patents Court. Their claims combined patent challenges with RAND relief. They sought relief concerning certain UK patents, and they also asked the English court to determine the terms of a global RAND licence for Nokia’s portfolio, including interim arrangements while the final terms were being resolved.

Both implementers gave unconditional undertakings to enter into any licence the court determined to be RAND, subject to adjustment on appeal. That was important because willingness to take a RAND licence is central in this area.

Nokia then made Adjustable Licence Offers. In essence, these were offers of immediate interim licences. The final licence terms would later be determined by ICC arbitration, and the interim position would then be adjusted to match that result. By the time of the first instance hearing, most interim terms had been agreed. The main live issue was whether final terms should be determined by the English courts or by arbitration.

The appeal raised three broad issues.

First, did the English court have jurisdiction over the RAND claims against Nokia, a Finnish company? Because Nokia was outside the jurisdiction, Acer and ASUS had to show that their claims fell within a recognised service-out gateway.

Secondly, even if jurisdiction existed, should the court stay the RAND claims on case management grounds? This became the practical centre of the appeal. Nokia argued that its adjustable licence offers meant there was no proper basis for the English court to continue deciding RAND terms at the implementers’ request.

Thirdly, should the court make interim licence declarations? Those declarations mattered because they were aimed at keeping the implementers trading while the final licence terms were being worked out.

The novel point was the effect of Nokia’s offer structure. The court had to decide whether an offer of an immediate licence, with final terms to be determined by ICC arbitration and then used to adjust the interim position, could itself be an offer on RAND terms. If it could, then refusing it had consequences for whether Acer and ASUS could still ask the English court to determine RAND terms.

The court also considered gateway arguments in some detail. It held that gateway 11 was available because the claims were properly characterised as contractual claims concerning obligations attaching to UK patents. It rejected Nokia’s challenge on that point, although it did not uphold all of the alternative gateway reasoning argued below.

On jurisdiction, Nokia lost. The Court of Appeal held that the RAND claims could pass through gateway 11. The claims were contractual claims seeking to enforce obligations attaching to UK patents. The fact that the licence sought was global did not change that characterisation.

The court accepted that patents are territorial rights, but it also recognised that standards are used globally and that a RAND licence may properly be global in scope. Even so, the relevant connection for gateway 11 was still the obligations attaching to UK patents.

On the stay, however, Nokia won. The Court of Appeal held that Nokia’s Adjustable Licence Offers were not merely invitations to arbitrate. They were offers of immediate licences capable of acceptance. The remaining dispute was the mechanism for determining final licence terms, and the court held that arbitration before an independent and impartial tribunal could determine RAND terms.

The court therefore concluded that Nokia had complied with its RAND obligation by making those offers. If Acer or ASUS refused them, they were refusing an offer of a licence on RAND terms. In those circumstances, they could not invoke the English court’s declaratory jurisdiction to ask the court to determine RAND terms at their request.

The court said the RAND claims therefore had no real prospect of success and should be stayed on case management grounds. It also held that the interim licence declarations made by the judge had to be discharged.

The court proposed that the stay should be subject to conditions aimed at reducing wasted costs if the implementers accepted the adjustable licence offers. Those proposed conditions included using the existing statements of case, disclosure and evidence in the arbitration, and treating the costs incurred on the final RAND licence claims as costs in the arbitration. The court allowed written submissions on whether those conditions should be imposed.

For most businesses, this is not a general commercial contract case. It is a specialised authority about SEP licensing. Its direct relevance is strongest if you make, import or sell products that rely on standardised technology and may need a portfolio patent licence.

The practical lesson is about process as much as price. In this area, the structure of an offer can matter just as much as the royalty number. Nokia’s offer worked because it gave immediate licence cover and used a later mechanism to settle final terms. The Court of Appeal accepted that this could still be an offer on RAND terms.

That means a business should not dismiss an interim licence offer simply because the final price is not fixed on day one. The right question is whether the offer gives real immediate cover and whether the later mechanism for settling final terms is one the court is likely to treat as capable of producing RAND terms.

The case also shows that cross-border litigation can narrow your options quickly. Nokia had already started proceedings in several jurisdictions. Acer and ASUS tried to use the English court to secure a global RAND determination. They succeeded on jurisdiction, but not on the practical outcome. For a business under licensing pressure, early strategy matters.

If your business is in a standards-heavy sector, keep a clear record of your willingness to take reasonable terms. In this case, the court focused on whether refusing Nokia’s offer meant the implementers were refusing RAND terms. Conduct, timing and the wording of responses can all become important later.

Several features of the case shaped the result.

First, the ITU-T declarations mattered because they created the RAND framework. The Court of Appeal proceeded on the basis that Nokia was obliged to make RAND offers capable of acceptance by implementers such as Acer and ASUS.

Secondly, the implementers’ unconditional undertakings to enter into any licence the court determined to be RAND were important, but they did not solve the problem once the court held that Nokia had already made an offer on RAND terms.

Thirdly, the wording and structure of the Adjustable Licence Offers were central. The court treated them as offers of immediate licences, not just procedural invitations to arbitrate. That was the turning point on the stay.

Fourthly, the wider litigation context mattered. Nokia had already started infringement proceedings in multiple jurisdictions seeking injunctive or exclusionary relief. That gave the dispute a strong commercial urgency and made forum choice more significant.

Finally, the court noted that the parties had agreed most interim licence terms by the time of the first instance hearing. The main remaining issue was who would determine final terms. That made the process question decisive.

The Court of Appeal judgment was handed down on 12 May 2026. It came from the Patents Court decision of Mr Justice Mellor, correctly cited as [2025] EWHC 3331 (Pat).

The Court of Appeal dismissed Nokia’s appeal on jurisdiction, but allowed its appeal on the case management stay. It also held that the interim licence declarations made below had to be discharged.

The durable point is narrow. A SEP owner may satisfy its RAND obligation by offering an immediately effective interim licence whose final terms are later determined by arbitration and then used to adjust the interim position. If that happens, an implementer may not be able to continue asking the English court to set the terms instead.