AJP Homes Limited v Tate Estates (Lambert House) Limited

This dispute grew out of a redevelopment next door to an existing residential property in Harrogate. AJP Homes owned 106 Station Parade. Tate Estates owned 108 Station Parade, a site that had previously been Lambert House and was later redeveloped into an apartment block.

The sites were separated by a small alley. Access over part of AJP’s land was governed by a 2016 transfer. That transfer became the centre of the case because it granted both a right of way over land shaded green and a separate parking right over an area edged pink.

During the build, Tate Estates’ contractor, Harris CM Ltd, used the access land for construction activity. AJP said this went too far and amounted to trespass. Tate Estates said the transfer rights were broad enough to cover what happened on site.

The original claim was heard in the County Court in Leeds. AJP sought damages for 31 alleged acts of trespass between July and October 2021. It said the contractor had stopped vehicles, unloaded materials and stored items on AJP’s land beyond the rights granted by the transfer.

Tate Estates accepted only four acts of trespass and said they were de minimis. It also argued that the transfer allowed stopping and unloading on the green land. On top of that, Tate Estates counterclaimed, saying AJP had erected Heras fencing that interfered with its right of way and parking easement.

The County Court dismissed AJP’s trespass claim and awarded Tate Estates nominal damages on the counterclaim for interference with its right of way. The judge also made declarations recording key findings and ordered AJP to pay 90% of Tate Estates’ costs of the claim, with a payment on account of £160,000, while ordering Tate Estates to pay the costs of the counterclaim.

AJP then appealed. Permission to appeal was granted on limited grounds only. The High Court appeal therefore was not a full rehearing of every issue in the case. It focused on the contractor responsibility point and specific questions about how the transfer should be interpreted.

The appeal raised two main groups of issues. The first was whether Tate Estates had admitted legal responsibility for the acts of its contractor, Harris CM. The second, and more important, was how the 2016 transfer should be interpreted.

On construction, the court had to decide whether the right of way over the green land allowed vehicles not only to pass but also to stop and load or unload. It also had to decide whether the alley could be used to reach the undercroft parking area in the redeveloped building, and whether the right of way extended over the pink-and-green area as well as the separate parking right.

These were not abstract title questions. They went directly to whether the complained-of site activity was within the granted rights or was actionable trespass. They also affected the counterclaim, because if Tate Estates had broader rights than AJP accepted, fencing off part of the route could itself be wrongful interference.

The wording of the transfer did most of the work in this case. Clause 2.1 granted an exclusive right to park one domestic vehicle or small van within the area edged pink on Plan 2, and or for such other use as authorised by planning, subject to maintaining that area.

Clause 2.2 granted a right of way over the area shaded green on Plan 2, with or without vehicles, for all purposes connected with the property. That is broad language. The court treated it as important that the right was not expressed in narrow terms.

Clause 2.3 also formed part of the background. It gave rights to construct a road and landscaping on the green land, install service media and carry out related works, subject to conditions including producing necessary consents, carrying out works properly, causing as little disturbance as reasonably practicable and making good damage.

Clause 4.1 mattered as well. The buyer covenanted not to block, or allow others to block, the area shown shaded green on Plan 2 with vehicles or otherwise, other than as permitted by clause 2.1. That covenant helped the court read the right of way and the parking right together.

The High Court dismissed the appeal. It upheld the County Court’s interpretation of the 2016 transfer and left the main result in place. In practical terms, that meant AJP’s trespass case failed on the key points that mattered.

On the right of way, the court agreed that the wording was broad enough to include stopping on the green land for the purpose of loading and unloading. The judge accepted that a right to pass can, depending on the wording and physical setting, include stopping to load and unload.

The court also agreed that the right of way allowed access through the alley to the undercroft parking area. It rejected the argument that the transfer should be read as limited by planning material in a way the deed did not clearly say.

Finally, the court upheld the view that the right of way extended over the pink-and-green area as well as the separate parking right. The deed was read as a whole, including the covenant not to block the green land.

AJP also argued that Tate Estates had effectively admitted responsibility for the acts of Harris CM, its contractor. The High Court did not allow the appeal on that ground.

The important practical point is not that contractor responsibility can never matter. It plainly can. The point here was narrower. The High Court said that even if AJP had been right about the admission issue, that would not have changed the justice of the result on the facts found below.

The judge noted that most of the alleged trespasses found below were insignificant apart from a cabin and a skip for a two month period and the storage of flooring and walling stone for a number of days. AJP had not pursued injunctive relief at trial, and there was no basis for remitting liability for a retrial given the limited damages position identified in the judgment.

The court also noted that, even on AJP’s own best case, any negotiating damages would have been very limited on the findings that were not separately appealed. That is why this part of the judgment should be read carefully. It does not remove contractor risk in general. It says that, on these facts, the point would not have changed the overall result.

The court gave real weight to the actual words used in the transfer. A right to pass with or without vehicles over the green land for all purposes connected with the property is not naturally read as a bare right to move through without ever stopping.

The background also supported that reading. At the time of the 2016 transfer, it was known that Lambert House was due for demolition. The court considered that the parties could not sensibly have intended access rights so narrow that demolition and redevelopment could not practically be carried out.

The physical layout mattered too. The route led to Lambert House and into the alley. The court accepted that stopping to load and unload on the green land was part of practical access in that setting. It also noted that the original building extended right up to the boundary, making it difficult to see how demolition could have begun without vehicles stopping on the green land.

The High Court also stressed that the trial judge had carefully analysed the transfer against the admissible background and then tested the result against ordinary principles of contractual interpretation. That mattered on appeal because AJP was largely challenging the weight given to background facts, which is usually difficult to overturn where the lower court has taken a careful and lawful approach.

One of the more practical points in the case was whether the area that carried the separate parking right could also form part of the route. AJP argued that the pink-and-green area should be treated only as a parking area, or at least that any right of way there was limited to access for parking.

The High Court upheld the County Court’s broader reading. The right of way extended over that area as well as the separate parking right. The court treated clause 4.1 as important because it showed the parties contemplated that the green land should not be blocked except as permitted by the parking clause. That only made sense if the area still had a wider access function.

The court also accepted that the seller was not effectively excluded from all sensible use of the area. The judgment records that the parties contemplated some continuing use of the land, including amenity or landscaping use, and that conflicts between the rights should be resolved sensibly rather than by assuming the most extreme possible use.

One of AJP’s arguments was that planning material should narrow the transfer rights, especially in relation to access to the undercroft. The High Court rejected that argument on the wording before it.

That is a useful point for businesses. Planning permission and private property rights are different things. Planning documents may be relevant background, but they do not automatically cut down clear rights granted in a transfer unless the deed itself clearly links the rights to those documents or to a specific approved scheme.

That distinction matters in practice. A planning consultant may say a layout is acceptable from a planning perspective, but that does not answer whether deliveries, turning movements or access over neighbouring land are privately authorised. You need both pieces to line up.

If you are buying or developing a site, this case is a reminder that easements and covenants can shape build logistics just as much as the construction contract. A broad right of way may support deliveries, turning, stopping and access to new parking areas if the wording and context point that way.

If you own the burdened land, the case is a warning against assuming that inconvenient site activity is automatically trespass. Before fencing off land, restricting access or threatening proceedings, check the transfer and plans carefully. A wrong move can trigger a counterclaim for interfering with rights of way or parking easements.

If you are instructing contractors, do not leave these issues buried in title documents. Turn them into written site rules. The legal wording should be reflected in delivery instructions, traffic management, neighbour communications and escalation procedures.

This is especially important on constrained urban sites. Tight corners, shared alleys and mixed route and parking areas create room for genuine disagreement. A short legal review before works start is usually far cheaper than arguing later about trespass, delay and who pays the costs.

For many businesses, the practical failure is not in the drafting but in the handover from legal documents to site operations. If the deed allows stopping to unload, say so clearly. If it does not allow storage, say that too. If a route must stay clear except for a defined use, make that part of the contractor brief.

It is also worth keeping a simple record of any neighbour discussions and temporary arrangements. If a dispute later arises, contemporaneous instructions, plans and emails can help show whether the site team acted within the granted rights or drifted beyond them.

The High Court judgment was handed down on 6 November 2025 by Mr Justice Leech in the Business and Property Courts in Leeds. It concerned an appeal from a County Court judgment dated 27 March 2024. Permission to appeal had been granted on 29 November 2024, limited to specific grounds. The High Court dismissed the appeal.

The hearing took place on 10 October 2025. The order under appeal had been made on 1 May 2024 and recorded the County Court’s declarations, dismissal of the trespass claim, nominal damages on the counterclaim and the main costs orders.